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WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? BALANCING 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND PRIVACY IN 
DIGITAL CONSUMER LENDING 
AARON CHOU† 
ABSTRACT
The availability of credit is a foundation of the American economy, 
but not everyone has an avenue to credit. Financial Technology
(“FinTech”) lending plays a sizable role in providing these avenues for
Americans who would not otherwise have access to loans and are 
forced to turn to high-cost loan instruments like payday lending. Most
scholars who have contributed to the topic of FinTech lending have
focused on the risk of discrimination by Artificial Intelligence within 
FinTech lending platforms. This Note argues that given the recent 
history of data breaches in the credit industry, privacy issues should be
a part of the larger discussion. Furthermore, balancing privacy with
FinTech lending’s goal of financial inclusion will be a task required by
regulation such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
This Note argues that the number of issues that might arise—the
inherent invasiveness of FinTech and the unfairness of the contracts; 
the biased nature of their algorithms; the lack of transparency; and the 
danger of data breaches—should ultimately play second fiddle to the
goal of financial inclusion. The reason is that although the two
priorities of privacy and access to credit seem to offset one another, they
actually balance in counterintuitive ways. Even though there are 
legitimate privacy concerns with the FinTech model, they can be 
softened by greater transparency. Toward this end, this Note discusses 
the solutions that have been offered to help eliminate the opacity of
FinTech lending’s Artificial Intelligence and ultimately proposes the 
use of counterfactual explanations to develop accountability in
FinTech lending while expanding financial inclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a person, Brad Freeman, who is interested in taking out
a consumer loan. Brad considers himself middle class but does not have 
a credit score, so he does not qualify for a bank loan. Instead, he hears 
about a new online lender called IntelligentLoan, which can lend him
money at an interest rate close to what a bank would offer. All it takes 
is Brad’s consent for the lender to search through his debit card
purchases, computer, and cell phone records. Once Brad agrees, the 
lender will be able to employ a computer program to search through
Brad’s records and, in as little as forty-eight to seventy-two hours,1 spit
out a yes-or-no determination on whether to grant Brad Freeman a 
loan. 
Now envision what the computer program might find from just 
one of Brad’s typical evenings after work. On his way home, Brad stops 
by a gas station to fill up his car. He chooses to pay inside so that he 
can buy a bottle of Dr. Pepper. Unbeknownst to him, most card users 
at this gas station fail to repay their credit card debt on time. Brad also 
works long hours, so it is late in the night when he arrives home, which 
is nestled in a neighborhood with a high unemployment rate. As usual,
he logs onto his computer to check social media and do some browsing. 
He sees a banner ad for a grill and, because he has been interested in 
buying a new one for a while, he clicks on the ad and purchases the 
grill. Finally, Brad glances over his son’s homework before texting him 
this reminder for the morning: “Morgan make sure 2 pick up HW…on
desk -DAD.”2 Many of Brad’s nights proceed in the same fashion, and
his day-to-day habits are more or less the same.
When it comes time for the computer program to decide whether 
Brad qualifies for a consumer loan, it may decide that all of these 
microdecisions are factors that weigh against him. The algorithm may
not discern that Brad went into the gas station for soda, and instead, it
may identify risk under the theory that people who pay inside are more 
likely to be smokers, a quality often correlated with lack of
creditworthiness.3 It may also knock Brad down a few theoretical pegs
1. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE 
MARKETPLACE LENDING 5 (2016) [hereinafter DOT, LENDING], https://www.treasury.gov/ 
connect/blog/documents/opportunities_and_challenges_in_online_marketplace_lending_white_ 
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPL3-QJCS].
2. This kind of text would not be unusual for this author’s own father to send.
 3. Charles Lane, Will Using Artificial Intelligence To Make Loans Trade One Kind of Bias
for Another?, NPR (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/ 
















   




    
  
      
  
   




     
 
  
2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1185
because he paid at an establishment where a significant number of 
customers default on their payments4 or because there is a high 
unemployment rate in the area where he resides.5 Other algorithms 
capture late-night internet use,6 shopping habits,7 hobbies,8 and 
punctuation quality in text messages9 as part of their computations. 
These types of data are known in the lending industry as 
alternative data,10 and the composite of alternative data is known as big
data.11 Companies that mine big data and use it to provide financial 
services are part of the growing field of Financial Technology 
(“FinTech”).12 Although IntelligentLoan is an imaginary company, it
is not entirely fictional. Hundreds of companies operate like 
IntelligentLoan by collecting big data to determine creditworthiness.
These companies, also known as FinTech lenders, are shaking up the 
financial services industry, with FinTech lending expected to reach 
2017/03/31/521946210/will-using-artificial-intelligence-to-make-loans-trade-one-kind-of-bias-for-
anot [https://perma.cc/F28T-Z7CS].
 4. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 148, 150–51 (2016) (describing the story of a credit card client whose credit limit was
reduced because he shopped at an establishment where other customers had high default rates).
5. Atay Kizilaslan & Aziz Lookman, Peer-to-Peer Loans: Can Economically Intuitive
Factors Improve Ability of Proprietary Algorithms To Predict Defaults?, LENDING TIMES (July 
17, 2017), https://lending-times.com/2017/07/17/peer-to-peer-loans-can-economically-intuitive-
factors-improve-ability-of-proprietary-algorithms-to-predict-defaults [https://perma.cc/LRE5-
QCS6] (analyzing how unemployment rates increase the ability to predict defaults in peer-to-peer
loans offered by FinTech company Lending Club).
 6. See Lane, supra note 3 (suggesting that late-night internet use corresponds with poor 
loan repayment and asserting that this could be used as a factor in calculating digital loans).




 10. Compare Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling
Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183, 11,184 (Feb. 21, 2017) (“‘Alternative data’
refers to any data that are not ‘traditional.’ We use ‘alternative’ in a descriptive rather than
normative sense and recognize there may not be an easily definable line between traditional and
alternative data.”), with id. (“‘Traditional data’ refers to data assembled and managed in the core
credit files of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies . . . . It also refers to data customarily
provided by consumers as part of applications for credit, such as income or length of time in
residence.”). 
11. See What Is Big Data?, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/big-data/guide/what-is-big-
data.html [https://perma.cc/4H3C-3WWT] (“Put simply, big data is larger, more complex data
sets, especially from new data sources.”). 
12. See STEPHEN FROMHART, DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., MARKETPLACE LENDING
2.0, at 1 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-
services/us-fsi-markeplace-lending2.pdf [https://perma.cc/24YL-PASX] (“Marketplace lending is
an integral piece of a larger fintech puzzle that is transforming the financial services industry.”).
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nearly 10 percent of all consumer loans in the United States and 
Europe within the next three years.13 
Thus far, the practice of FinTech lending may appear to be a bit 
nefarious, especially after learning how the information collected on
individuals like Brad can be equal parts misleading and invasive.
Despite these concerns, FinTech also provides hope for underserved
families who cannot obtain traditional loans. As this Note will discuss,
many families do not have a reliable way to access credit, either in the 
form of loans or credit cards. Even middle-class families like Brad’s will
struggle to put together an application that will be competitive for a 
traditional loan. FinTech is an alternative solution. If Brad’s loan
application is approved by IntelligentLoan, he now has access to a line 
of credit, likely at a lower interest rate than what he would otherwise
have had to pay. Perhaps Brad needs the loan to pay off hospital bills, 
childcare costs, or any number of other expenses families face today. 
As with many other technology-based solutions, government 
regulation may compromise FinTech lending’s ability to provide a 
benefit; in this case, increased credit to underserved families. It is 
understandable why regulators might harbor reservations about 
FinTech lending. In his article, Professor Matthew Adam Bruckner 
discusses how the “primary threat” to the promise of increasing 
financial access is the peril of financial services discrimination.14 
Indeed, legal academia in this field has largely focused the discussion 
on the risk of disparate impact.15 The argument generally follows that 
algorithms could mistakenly discriminate against certain groups of 
people even if a company is not “motivated by an intent to 
discriminate.”16 For example, certain data collected on Brad—most 
notably the neighborhood unemployment rate—may be used as 
proxies for race or education. 
13. Lane, supra note 3.
14. Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big 
Data, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 3, 7, 25 (2018). 
15. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 56–74 (2019) (noting the tension between Artificial Intelligence and civil
rights). 
16. Lauren Kirchner, When Discrimination Is Baked Into Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-
disparate-impact/403969 [https://perma.cc/9K63-6BWE]. 
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2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1187
On the other hand, as the Equifax data breach in 2017
demonstrated,17 privacy risks can be just as pervasive as discriminatory 
risks in the lending sphere. For instance, although Brad agreed to 
provide IntelligentLoan access to his computer and phone, he may not 
have realized that the lender would track his internet browsing history 
or his text messages. After all, such information is not something the
average Brad would expect to be related to his ability to pay back a 
loan. If Brad’s loan is denied, he could decide to request information 
on the reasoning, but it is unclear whether IntelligentLoan would 
respond with anything other than an inscrutable notice that the 
algorithm had deemed him a default risk. 
Although authors like Bruckner have homed in on the risk that 
algorithmic discrimination impedes the progress of FinTech lending, it 
is very likely the greater threat will come from regulations intended to 
protect user privacy. As the spotlight shines brighter on Artificial 
Intelligence (“AI”), calls for increased regulation of algorithmic 
decision-making have amplified.18 From the push behind the European
Union’s passage of the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”)19 to American citizens’ newfound interest in privacy
following the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal,20 data privacy 
has never been a more important topic. Many key players have 
criticized algorithms for being “black boxes,”21 a term used to describe
17. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Giant Equifax Data Breach: 143 Million People Could Be Affected, 
CNN BUSINESS (Sept. 8, 2017, 9:23 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/business/
equifax-data-breach/index.html [https://perma.cc/5CVP-ZQSW].
 18. E.g., Navneet Alang, Algorithms Have Gotten Out of Control. It’s Time To Regulate
Them, WEEK (Apr. 3, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/832948/algorithms-have-gotten-
control-time-regulate [https://perma.cc/RQY7-7PWM]; see also Kirchner, supra note 16 
(describing bias within algorithmic lending).
19. The GDPR is a “European Union data privacy and protection regime” that was designed
to provide increased protection for EU citizens’ personal data. The General Data Protection
Regulation: A Primer for U.S.-Based Organizations that Handle EU Personal Data, GIBSON DUNN
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-general-data-protection-regulation-a-primer-
for-u-s-based-organizations-that-handle-eu-personal-data [https://perma.cc/Y567-VFYS]. Two 
law professors have theorized that an unstated reason for the GDPR’s passage was to fight back
against American companies’ lax data-privacy standards. Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory 
Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–9 (2018). 
 20. Issie Lapowsky, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy Awakening, 
WIRED (Mar. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
privacy-awakening [https://perma.cc/YC4D-8T3J].
 21. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 
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the opacity of their processes. These larger, general data-privacy 
concerns over big data can be expected to spill over to FinTech, which 
collects big data in spades. The looming question, then, is whether the 
country’s growing concern for data privacy should leave any room for 
algorithms in digital lending to operate. This Note argues that the
answer is yes. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the 
history and background of traditional and FinTech lending. Part II 
explores the role FinTech lending can play in increasing access to credit 
for borrowers who have traditionally been denied such access, outlines
the privacy concerns with big data, and attempts to weigh the balance 
between access and privacy. Finally, Part III counters several
categorical solutions that have been offered for combatting privacy 
risks and discusses how an optimal solution exists for addressing
privacy concerns while simultaneously increasing access to credit. 
I. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the process that resulted in FinTech lending’s 
rollout. The first Section details the traditional lending model that
existed for much of history. The second Section introduces FinTech
lending, which is displacing many of the basic assumptions of 
traditional lending.
A. Introduction to Traditional Lending 
The business model for any bank lender is typically the same: find 
borrowers who will pay back their loans at a greater interest-rate
spread compared to what the lender paid while simultaneously
minimizing the number of borrowers who will end up failing to pay 
back their loans.22 In traditional banks, the role of screening out those
who were not creditworthy fell on real people, usually loan officers or 
credit managers.23 Even though this model has persisted throughout 
history, there is a genuine question as to whether humans are
satisfactorily capable of judging financial risk. One study conducted by 
psychologists revealed that in addition to “hard financial data,” loan 
56 (2017) (quotations omitted) (noting that such complex models have been characterized by the
media as “black boxes”).
 22. Marcy Gordon, Banking 101: How Banks Make Their Money, THESTREET (Apr. 20, 
2009, 2:24 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12802821/1/banking-101-how-banks-made-their-
money.html [https://perma.cc/FH79-PVMR].
 23. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 4, at 155.









     
     
 
    
     
   
  
   






       








2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1189
officers in large commercial banks also relied upon “soft impressions 
and gut feelings” regarding the credibility of the applicant.24 Another 
study found that loan officers frequently reach a conclusion early in the 
lending process and subsequently ignore information that is 
inconsistent with their initial impression.25 
Another pertinent issue is the type of information that lenders 
collect. Most lending “[i]n recent memory” has been done by a 
prospective borrower entering a brick-and-mortar bank and filling out 
paperwork about her “income, assets, and debts.”26 Over time though, 
lenders have learned to rely on the computation done by other 
companies, such as the Fair Isaac Corporation (“FICO”), so that along
with the paperwork, banks pull the prospective borrower’s credit score
to decide whether to extend a loan.27 Today, nearly every traditional 
loan decision is based on a credit score.28 A consumer could
theoretically avoid going through this process of obtaining a loan by 
using a credit card and racking up credit card debt, but the consumer 
would still run into the same hurdles because credit card companies use 
similar information when evaluating prospective cardholders.29 The 
issue is that the time it takes for loan officers to review this information
is costly and inefficient.30 Moreover, evidence suggests that credit 
history may not even be the best predictor of loan repayment rates.31 
24. Raanan Lipshitz & Nurit Shulimovitz, Intuition and Emotion in Bank Loan Officers’
Credit Decisions, 1 J. COGNITIVE ENG. & DECISION MAKING 121, 212 (2007) (quotations
omitted).
25. Paul Danos, Doris L. Holt & Eugene A. Imhoff, Jr., The Use of Accounting Information
in Bank Lending Decisions, 14 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 201, 235 (1989). 
26. Bruckner, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
27. Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling Techniques
in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183, 11,184 (Feb. 21, 2017). 
28. Luke Herrine, Credit Reporting’s Vicious Cycles, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
305, 307 (2016).
 29. See Melanie Lockert, Credit Card Approval: What Factors Matter?, CREDIT KARMA
(July 22, 2019), https://www.creditkarma.com/credit-cards/i/credit-card-approval
[https://perma.cc/EP8U-WEPH] (detailing the factors that credit card companies consider when
issuing a credit card). 
30. See  EVA WOLKOWITZ & SARAH PARKER, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, BIG
DATA, BIG POTENTIAL: HARNESSING DATA TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET
4 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/13062352/
Big-Data-Big-Potential-Harnessing-Data-Technology-for-the-Underserved-Market.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q2G-BR3B] (describing traditional lenders’ use of “rudimentary computing
power” and the difficulty of “gathering and normalizing data” as “relatively inefficient”).
 31. See Louise Matsakis, Your Smartphone Choice Could Determine If You’ll Get a Loan, 
WIRED (May 8, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/your-smartphone-could-decide-
whether-youll-get-a-loan [https://perma.cc/FP75-AWKD] (“The researchers ultimately found
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1190 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1183
B. Primer on FinTech Lending 
In an industry built on eliminating default risk, a new type of 
lender has emerged to modernize the old system for evaluating
creditworthiness. Instead of resembling banks, credit card companies,
or credit bureaus, “FinTech lenders” are online-only startups that shun 
the human-based lending model to make lending quicker, more
efficient, and less expensive so that reduced expenses can be passed 
onto borrowers.32 FinTech is a term used to describe “the wide universe
of innovative technology-enabled financial services”;33 FinTech
lending is simply one of those services. One way to think about FinTech 
is to view the technologies as alternatives to traditional financial 
services. Cryptocurrencies like BitCoin are alternatives to slow 
payments.34 Automated advisers, “colloquially referred to as ‘robo-
advisers,’”35 are an alternative to human wealth managers.36 Likewise,
FinTech lending is an alternative to the traditional lending model 
described above.37 
FinTech lenders use a wide array of data to inform their lending 
decisions regarding whether to extend a loan and what interest rate to 
offer.38 The idea of using multiple data points to inform these lending 
that digital footprints equaled or exceeded the predictive power of traditional FICO-like credit
scores.”). 
32. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 85 (2018) [hereinafter
DOT, FINTECH], https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-
Creates-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf [https://perma.cc/2G5J-DUP2].
33. Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE 
J. ON REG. 735, 736 (2019).
 34. Id. at 771.
 35. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBO-
ADVISERS 1 (2017) [hereinafter IM GUIDANCE UPDATE], https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-
guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HL2-EALP].
 36. Omarova, supra note 33, at 787.
37. This Note will mainly use the term “FinTech lending” to capture this identity of being an
alternative to traditional lending. FinTech lending has been called several other names, including 
digital lending, see generally  AM. BANKERS ASS’N, infra note 146, algorithmic lending, see
generally Bruckner, supra note 14, peer-to-peer lending, and marketplace lending, see, e.g., 
Odinet, infra note 147, at 784. Although these terms are mostly synonymous, the latter two terms
hint at another unique aspect of FinTech lending: the creation of a decentralized credit market
between consumers and lenders. While this Note focuses on the use of alternative data to
determine creditworthiness, it is important to note that the field of FinTech lending is broader
and worthy of examination beyond this Note. Omarova, supra note 33, at 743–44. 
38. Eric Bank, How Marketplace Lenders Decide If You’re a Good Risk, CREDIBLE (Feb. 
10, 2017), https://www.credible.com/blog/personal-loan/marketplace-lenders-decide-good-risk
[https://perma.cc/R737-7EQ4].
















   
 
 
   
 






2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1191
decisions is not novel, however. The three major credit bureaus— 
Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion39—collect the personal and
financial information of consumers, compile them into a credit report, 
and provide the information to lenders and credit scorers, including 
FICO.40 The specific information carried varies between the credit 
bureaus, but in general, they include performance of a consumer’s 
prior loans, public records, credit inquiries, income, and length of time
at their home and employer.41 
The problem with using credit or FICO scores is that many
Americans have limited credit histories, making it difficult for them to 
take out traditional loans. Such consumers are either “unscorable,” 
meaning they have insufficient credit histories to generate a credit 
score, or “credit invisible,” meaning they do not possess any credit 
record at all.42 According to a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
(“CFPB”) estimate, twenty-six million American consumers are credit 
invisible and another nineteen million are unscorable.43 The same
study found that one’s likelihood of being credit invisible is correlated 
with income and race. In low-income neighborhoods, almost 30 percent 
of adult consumers are credit invisible and an additional 15 percent are
unscorable.44 Contrast that with upper-income neighborhoods where
only 4 percent of consumers are credit invisible and another 5 percent 
are unscorable.45 Similarly, “[a]bout 15 percent of Black and Hispanics 
are credit invisible (compared to 9 percent of Whites and Asians).”46 
Many of the credit invisible may want to establish a credit record but 
need a credit score to do so. Not knowing where to start, they turn to
39. Credit Reports and Scores, USA.GOV (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.usa.gov/credit-reports
[https://perma.cc/SWY7-Q976].
 40. See  LESLIE PARRISH, AITE, ALTERNATIVE DATA ACROSS THE LOAN LIFE CYCLE:
HOW FINTECH AND OTHER LENDERS USE IT AND WHY 4 (2018), 
https://www.experian.com/assets/consumer-information/reports/Experian_Aite_AltData
Report_Final_120418.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G8M-TQRW] (describing how lenders use
Experian’s core credit files); What Is a Credit Score?, MYFICO, https://www.myfico.com/credit-
education/credit-scores [https://perma.cc/4RCU-QVJE] (explaining that FICO credit scores are
calculated based on reports provided by credit bureaus Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian).
 41. PARRISH, supra note 40. 
42. CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 4 (2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XVN2-XDBP]. 
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1192 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1183
high-cost loan products47 that do next to nothing in helping them build
credit.48 
A creative solution to this problem was to expand the type of data
that lenders gathered. Lenders began expanding the breadth of big 
data to reach the prospective borrowers that traditional lenders could
not.49 The idea was that even if credit-invisible consumers did not have 
credit scores, the lender could base its decision off of other 
nontraditional data points.50 At first, alternative data merely meant 
data that were not specifically used by banks but were linked to 
traditional factors such as rent and utility payments, job stability, and 
others.51 Eventually, digital lenders expanded where they collected 
data to include information that few thought were relevant before.52 
The new model embraced the idea that data collected should measure 
a person’s character instead of just their credit history53 and today
includes information and sources such as cell phone data, social media,
shopping preferences, and personal habits.54 
The final wrinkle to FinTech lending arrived when FinTech
developers applied machine learning to lending evaluations to form
“smart” algorithms.55 Before smart algorithms, lending models relied
on humans to determine the weight of each factor, whereas smart 
algorithms are able to weigh the factors themselves.56 Specifically, 
smart-algorithm systems are trained to “recursively evaluat[e] the 
47. See infra Part II.A.
 48. Kim Porter, Understanding Payday Loans and Your Options, CREDIT KARMA (Sept. 12,
2019), https://www.creditkarma.com/advice/i/payday-loans [https://perma.cc/2WR2-6B4U]
(“[P]ayday lenders usually don’t report your payment history to the credit bureaus, which means
the loan is not helping you build credit.”).
 49. Bruckner, supra note 14, at 13. 
50. Id.
 51. See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 836–37 (1995) (finding that alternative selection
practices used in 1995 included new criterion like the ones listed).
 52. See  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC
SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 11–12 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_
discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC3W-3WPA] (“Some companies look at previously
untapped data” with the less conventional sources including “information gleaned from social
media platforms, purchasing preferences via online shopping histories, and even the speeds at 
which applicants scroll through personal finance websites.”).
53. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right To Be
Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 343.
54. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 7, at 279. 
55. See Bruckner, supra note 14, at 14 (describing previous iterations as “dumb” algorithms). 
56. Id.






















   
    
 
 




2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1193
output of each algorithm against a desired result.”57 To illustrate, if a
human programmer premarked a sample borrower as creditworthy 
and the algorithm found that sample borrower to be creditworthy, the 
system would mark it as a success. If the algorithm incorrectly labeled
the sample borrower as not creditworthy, the programmer would have 
the algorithm continue to refine its calculation of which data it used
and how much it weighted them along with other factors until it 
reached the proper result. By autonomously doing this process 
thousands of times, the program would “learn” by making its own 
connections within the available data. 
This discussion may make it seem like FinTech lending was rolled
out in a uniform manner, but FinTech lending is still a broad concept
used to describe a highly variable practice that is constantly evolving.
To illustrate, even the methods that FinTech lenders use to gather
information can vary. Some companies may selectively collect 
information from public records.58 Others may require a user to “opt
in” and share personal information “in exchange for more attractive
offers and lower rates.”59 The common thread connecting FinTech 
lenders is their collective ability to assist underserved communities—a
benefit which the following Part will hold up to the light for 
examination.
II. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF FINTECH LENDING
Among industry experts, expanded access to credit is the most 
frequently mentioned expected benefit of FinTech’s use of AI.60 At the
same time, “71% of consumers fear AI will infringe on their personal
privacy in some way.”61 These results represent competing principles. 
This Part will first assess how FinTech lending can effectuate financial 
57. KEVIN PETRASIC, BENJAMIN SAUL & MATTHEW BORNFREUND, RISK & COMPLIANCE
MAGAZINE, THE EMERGENCE OF AI REGTECH SOLUTIONS FOR AML AND SANCTIONS 
COMPLIANCE 4 (2017), available at https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/ 
download/publications/rc_apr17_reprint_white.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RZ-2CBN].
 58. PARRISH, supra note 40, at 9.
 59. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 30, at 6; see also id. at 9 (discussing FinTech lender 
Mint’s practice of collecting bank activity).
 60. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Fintech Lending: A Study of Expectations Versus Market
Outcomes, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 7) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (listing commentators’ responses to potential benefits in the OCC Request for
Comments). 
61. Olivia Krauth, Report: 71% of Consumers Fear AI Will Infringe on Their Privacy, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:59 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/report-71-of-
consumers-fear-ai-will-infringe-on-their-privacy [https://perma.cc/ZES8-SFTY].
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inclusion for communities that need it most, reviewing both the 
necessity and empirical basis for this purpose. This Part will then 
discuss the costs of FinTech lending, with a particular focus on privacy. 
The final Section will attempt to “balance” the two interests by arguing 
that FinTech lending can improve data privacy, not hinder it. 
A. The Role of FinTech Lending in Increasing Access
In 2016, the Obama administration announced that FinTech and 
big data could have a large role to play in increasing access to credit for 
underserved, unbanked communities.62 If FinTech lending can, in fact,
play a role in increasing access to credit, it would go a long way toward 
alleviating a serious issue plaguing low-income individuals and families 
in America: predatory lending. When traditional lenders turn away 
borrowers, borrowers are forced to seek out funds from other sources;
for many low-income families, the only option is to turn to payday 
lenders.63 Payday lending, which has been labeled “predatory lending” 
and “modern-day loan shark[ing],” is the practice of extending 
“extremely high-interest, short-term loans . . . to cash-strapped
customers.”64 Annual percentage rates for payday loans have been
spotted at rates as high as 400 percent, far outpacing the interest-rate
caps set by most states.65 Additionally, the payday-lending business 
model revolves around forcing customers to pay these astronomical 
interest rates all at once, without the opportunity for partial 
payments.66 The result: customers are forced to take out a new loan 
from the same payday lender just to pay off their old loan.67 This 
62. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 52, at 11.
 63. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) (explaining that the typical payday loan borrower “lack[s] access to traditional 
forms of credit”). 
64. Id. at 2–3.
 65. Payday Lending: A 400% Interest Debt Trap, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
https://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-lending-400 [https://perma.cc/9GVM-R5HQ].
 66. Bethany McLean, Payday Lending: Will Anything Better Replace It?, ATLANTIC (May
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/payday-lending/476403 [https:// 
perma.cc/LLH9-XJHD].
 67. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of
Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 601 (2000) (describing this practice of “touch 
and go” in payday lending).
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creates a vicious cycle for lower-income borrowers whereby they 
struggle to ever fully pay off their loans.68 
To alleviate this concern, FinTech lenders claim that their 
products increase access to nonpredatory loans. For example, FinTech 
lender Upstart’s company mission is “[f]inancial fitness for all.”69 If
their claims are accurate, FinTech lending would be a substantial
improvement over payday lending by first, providing lower interest 
rates, and second, reducing the number of credit-invisible consumers. 
If they are not, then FinTech would simply be an elegant idea for 
serving tech-savvy borrowers who already have credit access.70 
First, in terms of interest rates, FinTech lenders typically offer 
APR rates below 36 percent, and many have stated they would be
willing to accept a 36 percent cap on consumer loans.71 Part of the  
reason why rates can be low is because FinTech lenders generally
originate smaller loans.72 When lower-income consumers—the type
that take out payday loans—borrow money, they often only need a
relatively small amount to cover an expense.73 FinTech lenders and
68. Many of these stories have been told, including that of Leticia Ortega, who Professor
Creola Johnson introduced in her article. Johnson, supra note 63, at 2–3. Ortega was a cashier
who took out a payday loan because she feared she did not have enough cash to pay her overdue
bills. For a $300 loan, the National Money Service charged her $90 in interest due by her next
payday. When the loan became due, Ortega lacked the cash to repay the entire loan, so the
company continued to charge her $90 every two weeks. In the end, even after Ortega had paid
$1800 in interest, the company still did not consider her original $300 loan paid off. Id.
 69. Our Mission: Financial Fitness for All, UPSTART, https://www.upstart.com/blog/financial-
fitness [https://perma.cc/DV2B-PU8A].
70. One version of this theory is that the real FinTech borrowers are not underserved but
simply have self-control issues, overborrow, and exceed the limits on their non-FinTech loans. See
MARCO DI MAGGIO & VINCENT YAO, FINTECH BORROWERS: LAX-SCREENING OR CREAM-
SKIMMING? 27 (2018), https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/bank-resources/supervision-and-
regulation/events/2018/fintech/resources/session%207_marco_dimaggio.pdf?la=en [https://
perma.cc/3RXH-NNMA].
 71. DOT, FINTECH, supra note 32, at 91. 
72. DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING:
FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING 2 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPZ5-RQU9].
 73. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44868, SHORT-TERM, SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING: POLICY
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170614_R44868_ 
aab54dca525aba5babea4bb8cbeca992d5888f91.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4BW-29UT] (“Short-
term, small-dollar loan products are frequently used to cover cash flow shortages that may occur
due to unexpected expenses or periods of inadequate income.”); THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY
ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN & TODD J. ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 383 (2014) (drawing a parallel between payday loans and small consumer
finance loans because “[m]ost customers used payday loans because they had an urgent
need . . . . [and] used payday loans over relatively short time intervals”).
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their financiers can be more certain that consumers will pay back small
loans while financial institutions, consistent with their business model, 
continue to extend large loans with loan periods of several years.74 
Second, current practices suggest FinTech lending will reach more
underserved consumers than traditional lending fueled by credit 
scores. Although there is reason to doubt FinTech lenders would be 
willing to extend loans to the credit invisible or unscorable,75 there are 
perhaps ten million reasons to believe they will. Specifically, about 
one-third of unscorable consumers—or ten million—are not
considered to be high risk despite lacking a credit score.76 Additionally, 
more than 40 percent of unscorable customers are homeowners, and 
their incomes resemble consumers who do have credit scores.77 
FinTech lenders can gain an advantage over traditional lenders by
capturing this market of unscored consumers with comparable risk
profiles to consumers who receive traditional loans. 
FinTech lenders also have obligations to assist borrowers who 
have difficulty securing loans. FinTech lenders that apply for a charter 
from the Office of the Comptroller (“OCC”) to operate as special
purpose national banks are required to describe “how they will support 
the needs of the communities they serve and promote financial 
inclusion.”78 Obtaining a special purpose charter can benefit FinTech 
firms by granting them OCC preemption of state law.79 According to 
the OCC, even FinTech lenders that are not chartered under a special 
74. See PERKINS, supra note 72, at 22 (explaining why FinTech and traditional lenders have
thus far catered to different borrowers and predicting traditional lender responses to marketplace
lending).
75. It is inferable that lenders’ general wariness of fraudulent borrowers would produce
reluctance to lend to those with uncertain credit because they lack reliable records. Cf. PARRISH, 
supra note 40, at 6 (presenting evidence of lender concern about fraudulent borrowers and stating 
that the need to “root out fraud is particularly acute for fintech lenders, which do not know
prospective borrowers through existing banking relationships and conduct most—if not all—of 
their loan originations online”).
 76. Blake Ellis, Millions Without Credit Scores Not So Risky After All, CNN MONEY (Aug. 
14, 2013, 6:08 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/08/14/pf/credit-scores [https://perma.cc/49G9-
4EJQ].
 77. Id.
 78. Penny Crosman, Is It OK for Lending Algorithms To Favor Ivy League Schools?, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 9, 2017, 3:33 PM) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-it-ok-for-lending-algorithms-to-favor-ivy-league-schools
[https://perma.cc/R25P-EH97].
 79. The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Will Permit Special Purpose National
Bank Charters for Fintech Firms, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/us-
office-of-comptroller-of-currency-will-permit-special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-
fintech-firms [https://perma.cc/E939-HC2Z].
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purpose status have a duty to avoid policies that “might exclude a high 
number of applicants who have lower income levels or lower home
values than the rest of the applicant pool.”80 
The empirics also support FinTech lenders’ claims that their 
services will benefit the underserved. An academic study of a FinTech
company called Lending Club’s data history found that the company’s 
algorithms led it to areas where a shortage of credit existed.81 Lending 
Club continued to refine its algorithm, and as the correlation between 
its grades on borrowers and FICO scores declined, its algorithm’s 
ability to predict loan delinquency remained strong.82 All the while, the 
use of alternative data allowed Lending Club to increase the number 
of subprime borrowers who receive better loan grades.83 Its ability to 
price prospective borrowers who banks considered to be subprime at a
lower-risk rate meant borrowers at Lending Club paid lower interest 
than their counterparts with the same default risk who borrowed from
traditional banks or used credit cards.84 In sum, the study indicates that 
the use of alternative data granted consumers with historically weak 
credit profiles newfound access to loans.85 Another study found that 
alternative data has high predictive value and strengthens lenders’ 
ability to reliably rank risk in borrowers.86 This allows lenders to extend
loans to “underserved consumers represent[ing] prime or near-prime
credit risk to lenders.”87 
Though there are some mixed commentaries,88 FinTech lending
shows great promise because of the commitment to underserved 
80. Crosman, supra note 78 (quoting the OCC’s guidance on disparate impact).
81. Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing,
and Alternative Information 35–36 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017). 
82. Id. at 35. 
83. Id. at 25–26. 
84. See id. at 34 (“[F]or the same risk of default, consumers pay smaller spreads on loans 
from the Lending Club than from traditional lending channels, implying that Fintech lending has
provided credit access to consumers at a lower cost.”). 
85. See id. (“[C]onsumers with few or inaccurate credit records (based on FICO scores) 
[were now allowed] to access credit.”).
 86. RACHEL SCHNEIDER & ARJAN SCHÜTTE, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THE




88. Other research, for instance, indicates that although FinTech lenders have increased
access to credit, the evidence is divided on whether this credit is being made “available to
borrowers who are less creditworthy under traditional underwriting standards.” Di Lorenzo,
supra note 60, at 14.
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communities that public figures and FinTech lenders have touted. At 
the same time, obstacles such as privacy concerns may stymie this 
growing industry. 
B. Risks Facing FinTech Borrowers
Privacy and borrowing have always been intrinsically linked. 
“Money is an intensely private matter. Private debts are not the sort of
thing people like to discuss . . . not even to themselves in diaries and 
journals.”89 Part of this is a product of the fact that Americans are
embarrassed to talk about their inability to make payments, even
though “financial impotence” is a far more widespread issue than many 
people realize.90 This type of behavior is even more acute for lower-
income households struggling with debt. Low-income families desire a 
public image of fiscal responsibility,91 so instead of asking their families 
and friends for assistance with debts, they develop “an extensive set of
personal coping strategies to manage their bills in private.”92 As a
result, many low-income households bear their debt alone; for 
instance, more than a quarter of families turn to credit cards or loans 
as coping strategies, more than the number of families that rely on their 
social networks for financial assistance.93 
In the context of FinTech lending, the concept of privacy has 
evolved from consumers’ interest in the privacy of their personal debts
to privacy in terms of the scope of information creditors have access to. 
FinTech lenders collect and aggregate consumers’ personal 
information, granting them access to thousands of data points.94 Some
of this data could be considered quite sensitive. If there are indeed 
privacy concerns that arise from gathering certain types of alternative 
data, consumers will be forced to make a tradeoff between the ability 
to keep their debts private from family and friends in return for the 
89. LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
CONSUMER CREDIT 14 (1999).
90. Forty-seven percent of Americans say they would not be able to pay for a $400
emergency with cash. Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, ATLANTIC
(May 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/my-secret-shame/476415 
[https://perma.cc/UD7L-ZL2S].
91. Laura M. Tach & Sara Sternberg Greene, “Robbing Peter To Pay Paul”: Economic and
Cultural Explanations for How Lower-Income Families Manage Debt, 61 SOC. PROBS. 1, 5 (2014).
 92. Id.
 93. See id. at 10–11 (describing the results of a survey showing that 26.9 percent of
respondents choose a coping strategy of “debt juggling” compared to 11.8 percent that choose
social networks). 
94. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 30, at 11. 
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potentially uncomfortable idea of sending sensitive information to a 
faceless commercial lender. 
Data privacy is also likely to be at the forefront of consumers’ 
minds after the credit industry’s recent incident of data breach. In 2017, 
a data breach of the credit bureau Equifax’s database exposed the 
sensitive personal information of over 146 million Americans.95 
Hackers were able to access data including passport information, credit 
card numbers, and Social Security numbers.96 In the aftermath, a 
fourteen-month congressional investigation found that the data breach 
was “entirely preventable” and that Equifax failed to take basic steps 
such as modernizing its technology and storing the sensitive data on
up-to-date systems.97 Although this type of privacy risk is different 
from concerns over how information is gathered, the risk of exposure 
from data breaches is yet another reason to consider data privacy in
FinTech lending.
Privacy concerns are not restricted to FinTech lenders’ ownership 
of data. Critics have raised concerns over the transparency of data
suppliers, particularly when their interests do not fully align with those
of FinTech lenders. FinTech algorithms collect thousands of relevant 
data points, often including repayment rates on payday loans.98 The 
problem is that payday lenders control whether they release the
borrower’s repayment information.99 Perhaps at the risk of losing
borrowers to other underwriters, most payday lenders do not report
their customers’ positive payment histories to credit bureaus.100 
Conversely, payday lenders are not shy about threatening to report 
delinquencies to credit bureaus when consumers default on their 
loans.101 This method of selective information hoarding implicates
consumer privacy rights because consumers lack control over what 
95. Alex Johnson, Equifax Breaks Down Just How Bad Last Year’s Data Breach Was, NBC
NEWS (May 8, 2018, 7:25 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/equifax-breaks-down-
just-how-bad-last-year-s-data-n872496 [https://perma.cc/Z3DM-8HYN].
 96. Id.
 97. Equifax Data Breach Was “Entirely Preventable,” Congressional Report Finds, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018, 7:19 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equifax-data-breach-was-
entirely-preventable-congressional-report-finds [https://perma.cc/7VFZ-JP97].
 98. See  SCHNEIDER & SCHÜTTE, supra note 86, at 7 (listing payday lending as one of the 
behaviors analyzed by the consumer analytics service company L2C, Inc.).
 99. Porter, supra note 48. 
100. Id.
101. Liz Weston & Amrita Jayakumar, What Happens When You Can’t Repay a Payday
Loan?, NERDWALLET (June 8, 2018), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/payday-loan-
default [https://perma.cc/8FLH-WRYH].
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information of theirs is disseminated, which is a requirement of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).102 Information hoarding also
implicates a financial lender’s ability to analyze its customers, further 
limiting access to credit.103 To resolve this, FinTech lending broadens 
the amount of information that lenders can consider.104 Even if a credit 
report showed that a consumer failed to repay their loans, the
algorithm-based approach can consider that factor as a part of a whole. 
Finally, industry leaders recognize that privacy concerns warrant 
discussion. In 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department submitted a 
Request for Information (“RFI”) to marketplace lenders, trade
associations, academics, and others seeking feedback on marketplace 
lending.105 Many of the responses commented on the need for stronger 
data-privacy laws as more lenders expanded the data sources they 
relied upon.106 Some of those responses also highlighted the need for 
more disclosure so that consumers could conduct comparison shopping
across multiple lenders.107 Then in 2017, the CFPB released an RFI 
regarding the use of alternative data sources and modeling
techniques.108 In the press release for the RFI, the CFPB described one
of the reasons it was seeking information:
The CFPB is looking into privacy and security issues in the use of
alternative data that contains sensitive personal information.
Consumers may not know that it has been collected and shared or
102. See infra Part III.A.1. That Part discusses § 1681m of the FCRA in greater depth. In
summary, the Act “gives consumers important rights to know what information is being used and
when it impacts them adversely.” LAUREN SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FINTECH AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION: A SNAPSHOT 5 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/cons-
protection/rpt-fintech-and-consumer-protection-a-snapshot-march2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SL5S-2LEB].
 103. See Brad Brown, Michael Chui & James Manyika, Are You Ready for the Era of ‘Big
Data’?, MCKINSEY Q. (Oct. 2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
corporate-finance/our-insights/are-you-ready-for-the-era-of-big-data [https://perma.cc/JKQ9-
Z74C] (explaining how information hoarding prevents “companies from forming a coherent
view” of customers). 
104. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
 105. DOT, LENDING, supra note 1, at 19. 
106. The responses commented on lending to small businesses, but the rationale for stronger
data privacy applies to consumer lending as well. Id. at 24. 
107. Id.
108. At the time of the writing of this Note, the aggregate of the results has not been
published. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF
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how it will be used in the credit process. The Bureau will also explore 
whether some data are more prone to errors because of weaker or 
different standards than data traditionally used in credit decisions,
and whether consumers can correct errors in this information.109 
The RFIs are just one hint that the state of financial regulation is in 
flux.110 This Note does not dive into how existing financial regulation 
can be rebooted to account for FinTech, but the key is that privacy laws
are a part of the current regulatory framework. The question then
becomes how stringent the regulation should be while accounting for 
FinTech’s benefits.
C. The Balance Between Privacy and Access
To visualize how privacy and access to credit can be balanced in 
the context of FinTech, these interests can be considered along a
spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is the view that privacy is 
supreme. Advocates for this perspective might argue that the industry 
should limit FinTech lending until government entities, such as the 
CFPB, can conduct more research on how alternative data is used in
FinTech lending. A less radical approach would contend that the 
government should regulate FinTech lending to ensure only a limited 
universe of data points can be used by lenders.111 
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that access to credit
is an absolute end. Under this school of thought, privacy should not be 
a consideration if we are increasing access to borrowers at a lower cost 
compared to current options such as payday lending. In other words, if 
it takes companies searching through a borrower’s social media feed112 
109. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB EXPLORES IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE DATA 
ON CREDIT ACCESS FOR CONSUMERS WHO ARE CREDIT INVISIBLE (2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-explores-impact-alternative-data-
credit-access-consumers-who-are-credit-invisible [https://perma.cc/AWX3-7NHJ].
 110. See also DOT, FINTECH, supra note 32, at 63 (“[T]he regulatory framework, for banks
and nonbanks alike, must evolve to enable innovation on an orderly and sustainable basis.”).
 111. See infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
112. The topic of social media as data in FinTech lending is noteworthy because FinTech
lenders are split on whether social network data is too intrusive. Although Lending Club claims
that its underwriting machines do not use social media data in assessing someone’s risk because 
“[t]here are a ton of privacy concerns around using someone’s social media feeds,” many FinTech
lenders do not hide from the fact that they use social media in their datasets. Penny Crosman,
Can AI Be Programmed To Make Fair Lending Decisions?, AM. BANKER (Sept. 27, 2016, 1:59
PM) (quoting Lending Club’s chief investment officer),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/can-ai-be-programmed-to-make-fair-lending-decisions
[https://perma.cc/2EDH-3BEU]. One such digital lender, Lenddo, collects over 12,000 data points
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without disclosing it to help that borrower gain access to cheap, 
affordable credit, then it will have been worth it. 
This Note does not advocate for either of these extremes. Nor 
does it choose to oscillate between each end, simply arguing that both 
interests are important and that the advocates for both sides are well 
intentioned. Rather, it contends that financial inclusion should be the 
primary goal because there is more to be gained in access to credit and
because prioritizing access will help resolve data-privacy risks in
counterintuitive ways.
Financial instability is no longer limited to the poor; most families 
today are deeply indebted due to a shrinking middle class.113 When
people lose jobs, their living expenses are not magically wiped away.114 
Among families with incomes between two and six times the federal
poverty level, nearly four in five do not have sufficient assets to cover 
three-quarters of essential living expenses for three months if they 
were to suddenly lose their source of income.115 When medical
emergencies hit, they can cause, on average, over $15,000 in uncovered
expenses resulting in an “exogenous shock” to the family’s personal
budgets.116 In these situations, millions of Americans, especially in the 
low-to-middle class, may suddenly require loans at a moment’s notice.
Given the promising data indicating that FinTech lending can help
underserved communities, credit should not be reserved for those
borrowers who are best positioned to access it. 
In terms of the costs, privacy—despite its importance—should not 
be a bar to financial inclusion. In today’s online era, there is a healthy 
level of privacy that a person is willing to give up before they draw the 
theoretical line.117 For most Americans, trading privacy for 
from users’ social media sites like Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook. Bank, supra note
38.
113. Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at Risk, in  BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE
MIDDLE CLASS 226 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012). 
114. Take, for example, a Pennsylvania couple that fought to keep their home amid 
bankruptcy after the husband lost his job as a police officer. After their total family income
shrank, the couple only “had $130 per month that was not taken up by budgeted expenses.” 
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 53 (1989). 
115. Id.
116. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael Hoke, Get Sick, Get Out:
The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 97–98 (2008). 
117. Patrick Oppmann, In Digital World, We Trade Privacy for Convenience, CNN (Apr. 14, 
2010, 10:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/04/14/oppmann.off.the.grid/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/CM33-PV8Z].
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convenience is worth it for the ability to do things such as stay 
connected with friends and family on social media.118 But the line does
have to be drawn somewhere: those same internet users may be
concerned with the possibility that companies such as Facebook and 
Amazon track and use their telephone conversations and text messages 
to provide more relevant ads.119 
FinTech lenders would argue that the location of the line in the 
sliding scale of acceptable data collection is easier to identify in
FinTech lending. They contend that to access a user’s data, they must 
first gain the user’s consent, and the borrower can always decide what
“consent to share, or not.”120 For example, many digital lenders require
that prospective borrowers download an app onto their cell phones so 
that the algorithm can collect data from their phones.121 Before
proceeding, the app may request access to information stored on the 
user’s phone,122 and the FinTech firms will treat an agreement as 
binding consent.123 This is similar to the defense used by social media
sites accused of providing data to third-party apps, a practice which has 
generated criticism.124 But whether it is allowing a social media app to 
access one’s contacts or allowing a FinTech lender to access personal 
data, the user is entering into a transaction in return for a product or 
118. Id.
 119. Kaitlyn Tiffany, The Perennial Debate About Whether Your Phone Is Secretly Listening 
to You, Explained, VOX (Dec. 28, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/12/28/ 
18158968/facebook-microphone-tapping-recording-instagram-ads [https://perma.cc/997Y-
VFBV]; see also Rick Edmonds, People Don’t Want To Trade Privacy for Targeted Ads, POYNTER
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2016/people-dont-want-to-trade-privacy-
for-targeted-ads [https://perma.cc/Z5L7-9ZN4] (finding that consumers consider the trade-off
unfair and unbalanced).
 120. E.g., Kathryn Petralia, Regulate Fintechs for What They Do, Not What They Don’t, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 15, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/08/15/fintech-companies-regulation-kabbage
[https://perma.cc/773N-H8TY] (pointing to fellow FinTech company’s data access policy).
Kathryn Petralia is the cofounder and president of FinTech lender Kabbage. Id.
 121. Lane, supra note 3.
 122. Penny Crosman, How Fintechs Are Using AI To Transform Payday Lending, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 7, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-fintechs-are-
using-ai-to-transform-payday-lending [https://perma.cc/BG6Z-BJ79].
 123. See id. (relating FinTech company MyBucks’ deputy CEO’s statement that Android and
iPhone do not have privacy restrictions preventing apps from directly obtaining information from
a customer’s device with their consent).
 124. E.g., Facebook (@facebook), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 8:53 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
facebook/status/1003665970089603072?lang=en [https://perma.cc/8PVT-A9N8] (responding to a 
tweet alleging that Mark Zuckerberg lied to Congress about users’ control over their data on
Facebook by explaining that “companies could not integrate people’s Facebook information with
their devices without that person’s permission”).
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service. Such transactions are justified on freedom-of-contract 
grounds. If a customer is willing to disclose information about 
themselves and their activities in return for the opportunity to better
their financial situation, regulators should not intervene to prevent 
them from doing so. 
Critics of this argument claim that user consent is meaningless for 
multiple reasons. First, they argue that the lack of alternatives for 
consumers grants lenders substantially more bargaining power than
consumers.125 This “imbalance of bargaining power” could essentially 
result in banks forcing consumers to sign consent agreements, 
regardless of whether the consumer finds the terms agreeable.126 
Second, critics argue the willingness to disclose information is often 
based on irrational decision-making.127 The problem is that even when
consumers enter into what the critics would consider to be balanced 
and rational transactions, they put their privacy at risk. Consumers 
already provide vital information to traditional credit bureaus such as 
Equifax, but their private information was still exposed.128 In this 
respect, AI may be better equipped to protect against data breaches.129 
Since digital lenders rely even more on data than physical banks, many
of them spend more resources on building up fraud detection and 
cybersecurity measures.130 
Perhaps more importantly, the critics’ concerns exist as part of the 
modern social contract in which people make cost-benefit decisions 
about data privacy every day. “People who are underbanked tend to 
be unconcerned about privacy. They’re more worried about meeting
an urgent need for cash.”131 Although roughly 70 percent of online
households report having privacy concerns, only 33 percent said
privacy concerns stopped them from revealing information in their
125. See Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making: Algorithmic 
Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 
9 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 20 (2018) (“[G]iven the imbalance of
bargaining power that characterizes many transactions, one should not be surprised if . . . a bank
could force a potential client requesting a loan to consent to a decision taken by an algorithm.”).
 126. Id.
127. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 53, at 366.
 128. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
 129. Zack Miller, Gaming the System: Loan Applicants Are Reverse Engineering the Online 
Lending Algorithms, TEARSHEET (July 11, 2018), https://tearsheet.co/data/gaming-the-system-
online-loan-applicants-are-reverse-engineering-the-algorithms [https://perma.cc/26BR-CTGE].
 130. Id.
 131. Crosman, supra note 122. 
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online activities.132 These modern understandings of digital privacy 
should prompt requirements for more comprehensive disclosure about 
collected data rather than limitations on FinTech lending.133 Such
disclosures might include a statement that an algorithm is being used, 
where information is being collected, and a description of the risks 
inherent in the use of an algorithm.134 
Even with the focus on financial inclusion, access to credit can 
actually work hand-in-hand with promoting privacy.135 Increased 
transparency about the type of data that FinTech lenders collect and 
how companies evaluate this data helps consumers understand what 
they can do to increase their creditworthiness while helping lenders 
improve their customer base.136 If a loan request is rejected, the 
borrower will be able to head back to the drawing board, assuming she 
understands the data that is being incorporated into the company’s 
lending decisions. If a request is successful, the borrower can still alter 
her habits with the prospect of receiving a more favorable interest rate 
the next time they borrow. Additionally, “establishing clear avenues of 
inquiry and communication for consumers to advise on the accuracy of 
data points or dispute their veracity goes one step further toward
encouraging the consumer to be a partner in enhancing data 
accuracy.”137 Achieving greater accuracy then lowers risks for lenders,
which can lead to better product access and terms for borrowers.138 
Finally, it is important to note that the risks in digital lending are
not siloed to privacy. Algorithm-based discrimination, the other main
concern, has received significant scholarly attention, but it is worth a
brief discussion here. Even if FinTech lending companies “have no
animus against minority groups, they can induce disparate impact by 
132. Fred Donovan, Americans Fret About Loss of Control over Personal Information, 
HEALTH IT SECURITY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/americans-fret-about-
loss-of-control-over-personal-information [https://perma.cc/G4P5-7X5P]. 
133. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) appears to be ahead of the curve on
this matter. The SEC regulates robo-advisers, or automated investment advisers, under the 
Investment Act. IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 35, at 1. In 2017, the SEC released guidance
directed at robo-advisers with recommendations on how to properly disclose the services they 
perform to investors. Id. at 3. The CFPB could look to the example set by the SEC and require
FinTech lenders adopt similar disclosures.
134. For a full list of the SEC’s suggested disclosures, see id. at 3–4. It should be fairly self-
explanatory how several of the disclosures could be applied to FinTech lending.
 135. See infra Part III.A.
 136. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 30, at 11. 
137. Id.
 138. Id.
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their use of Big Data variables.”139 Research indicates discrimination is 
in fact a statistically valid concern in FinTech lending.140 One study 
found that FinTech lenders charge minority borrowers up to 5.3 
percent more in interest on mortgage loans.141 But the same research
concluded that “FinTech algorithms discriminate 40% less than face-
to-face lenders.”142 And although lenders charged higher interest rates,
they found that “FinTech lenders do not discriminate in mortgage
accept/reject decision-making.”143 
Notably, the results of the study improved between 2009 and 2015,
which the researchers attributed to increased competition in the
FinTech lending space, as one of two possibilities.144 Because the
potential benefits for a new class of borrowers has great promise, the 
solution to the problem should be minimizing the discrimination in
algorithmic lending, not eliminating the technology itself and
perpetuating human biases.145 Even if the balance between privacy and 
financial access could be struck, the industry should never stop 
reevaluating how it can improve itself. The following Part takes a
deeper look at what a potential solution for alleviating both privacy
and discriminatory risks could look like.
III. THE REALITIES OF REGULATION
Algorithmic lending is already here and here to stay. FinTech 
consumer-loan originations are expected to reach $90 billion by 2020.146 
Relatedly, FinTech lending is already being canned into existing 
regulatory laws.147 This Note has established that no new and dramatic 
regulations should be passed to limit innovation. But any solution will 
have to come with adjustments to the way FinTech lending complies 
139. Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Consumer-Lending
Discrimination in the FinTech Era 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25943,
2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25943.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ5J-G6UN].
 140. See id. at 4 (noting statistical disparities in FinTech lending).
 141. Id.
 142. Id.
 143. Id. at 20. This was after accounting for “underwriting variables,” which is an assumption
that could be challenged but one that this Note will not address. Id.
 144. Id. at 16. 
145. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
146. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, THE STATE OF DIGITAL LENDING 5 (2018), http://www.aba.com/ 
Products/Endorsed/Documents/ABADigitalLending-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KQC-
LQZU]. 
147. Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781,
816 (2018).



















    
  
  
   
2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1207
with existing regulations. This Part will first examine the framework of 
laws that will mandate some form of ex post disclosure. Then, it will 
discuss what types of ex post disclosure solutions have been offered but
why they should ultimately be rejected. Finally, this Note will provide 
a new solution by applying an old proposal for algorithms in general.
A. Framework 
Improved contracting and preliminary disclosures are important 
and much-needed changes for combatting privacy concerns, but they
are insufficient means of resolving the tension because FinTech lenders 
must also deal with usury laws mandating disclosure of information
after a decision is made as well. The following sections detail the 
framework of laws mandating disclosure that any FinTech lender will 
have to operate within. 
1. Truth in Lending Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act: Regulations
on Disclosure. There are two laws that regulate the disclosure of 
consumer information in the lending industry. The first is the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”).148 Because “enforcement of TILA is relegated,
per the Dodd-Frank Act, to the CFPB,”149 the CFPB issued its own
regulation interpreting TILA, titled Regulation Z.150 TILA aims “to 
provide meaningful disclosures to borrowers in helping them 
understand the nature of the financial transactions they enter into.”151 
It is important to note that TILA is focused on requiring the disclosure
of information related to the financial terms of the loan itself,152 which 
may not bear much on privacy.
A second relevant law focuses on the disclosure of substantive 
information. The FCRA aims to promote “fairness, impartiality, and a 
respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.”153 FCRA § 1681m(h) 
imposes a duty to disclose on third-party creditors who use credit 
148. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2018). 
149. See Odinet, supra note 147, at 817.
 150. See id. at 816.
 151. Id.
 152. See id. at 817 (“TILA requires the disclosure of finance and any other charges, periodic
interest rates, any security interests to be taken in connection with the loan, payment information,
and more specific information relative to the type of loan and repayment structure.”).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
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1208 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1183
reports and “take adverse action” on an application for credit.154 If 
adverse action is taken, which is interpreted to mean either loan denial
or increased costs,155 the FCRA requires creditors to provide “adverse
action notices specifying the top factors used to make that decision.”156 
Creditors are also required to provide notice to consumers if the 
credit’s “material terms” are “materially less favorable than the most 
favorable terms available to a substantial proportion of consumers.”157 
Under § 1022 of Regulation V (“Reg V”), which interprets the 
FCRA,158 creditors must provide such consumers a “risk-based pricing
notice.”159 An adequate risk-based pricing notice must include, among
other disclosures, why a lender turned down an applicant and the 
sources of information it used in its analysis.160 
In other words, the FCRA, with guidance from the CFPB, requires 
lenders to provide borrowers with relevant information about why they 
were given adverse or materially worse credit determinations. In 
practice, however, the FCRA is loosely enforced. When most credit 
agencies or credit-scoring vendors make decisions or generate ratings, 
they mail a standard form with at most four numeric codes checked off,
154. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON
SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 15 (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684187.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2GZ-P7HS].
155. David F. Freeman, Jr., Christopher L. Allen, Ronald D. Lee, Thomas A. Magnani &
Nancy L. Perkins, FTC Report on Big Data Could Foreshadow Big Compliance Issues: 
Implications for Unfair Lending, Credit Reporting, and Unfair and Deceptive Practices
Compliance, ARNOLD & PORTER (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/1/ftc-report-on-big-data
[https://perma.cc/D6AQ-K2M2].
156. Carol A. Evans, Keeping Fintech Fair: Thinking About Fair Lending and UDAP Risks, 
CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (2017), https://www.consumercomplianceoutlook.org/2017/
second-issue/keeping-fintech-fair-thinking-about-fair-lending-and-udap-risks [https://perma.cc/
AA4A-BB5A].
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(1).
158. Part 1022 – Reg V – Fair Credit Reporting (FCRA) Compliance, COMPLIANCE 
ALLIANCE, https://www.compliancealliance.com/laws-regulations/federal-bank-regulations/fcra-
compliance [https://perma.cc/57V3-X5Z2].
159. General Requirements for Risk-Based Pricing Notices, 12 C.F.R. § 1022.72(a) (2019); see 
also Using Consumer Reports for Credit Decisions: What To Know About Adverse Action and
Risk-Based Pricing Notices, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/using-consumer-reports-credit-decisions-what-know-about-adverse 
[https://perma.cc/GF4Z-UB6T].
160. Content, Form, and Timing of Risk-Based Pricing Notices, 16 C.F.R. § 640.4(a)–(b)
(2019). 














    
  
 
    
 
 




   
       
  
  
    
 
     
   
   
 
 
    
 




2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1209
each one associated with a brief, standard explanation.161 In the end,
this list is usually only decipherable to lawyers and compliance staff.162 
Although FinTech lenders are a relative newcomer to the scene,
they are most likely163 covered under the statutory scope of § 1681m of
the FCRA.164 Actual compliance, however, is a more complex matter. 
The black box nature of machine-learning algorithms complicates
disclosure. Because machine learning operates via its own designs,
owners of AI tools have a difficult time explaining with precision why 
AI makes certain decisions.165 Forcing FinTech lenders to spend
significant resources reverse-engineering the algorithms for the
formulas they used would not help further the goal of increased access 
to credit. Fortunately, cracking the black box does not seem as 
impossible as it once did. Companies like Alphabet, IBM, and KPMG
are in the process of creating or “have already built tools for explaining
161. Greg Fisher, US FICO Credit Risk Score Reason Codes, CREDIT SCORING SITE (Mar. 
31, 2010), http://www.creditscoring.com/creditscore/fico/factors/reason-codes.html [https://
perma.cc/Z8JM-RMFT].  
162. Id.
 163. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CREDIT INVISIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE DATA:
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 2 (2015), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/ib-credit-
invisible-june2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN46-2YTR] (“‘Big Data’ used for credit, employment,
insurance, or other purposes is covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.”); Mark MacCarthy,
Opinion, EU Privacy Law Says Companies Need To Explain the Algorithms They Use, CIO (Oct. 
19, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3234305/eu-privacy-law-says-companies-need-to-
explain-the-algorithms-they-use.html [https://perma.cc/FP67-5UW7] (explaining that the U.S.
has disclosure rules requiring all lenders, including digital lenders, disclose “major factors”). 
164. Even if we considered the statutory scope of the FCRA as an original matter—in other
words, without taking the articles cited supra note 163 at their word—FinTech lenders would most 
likely lose if challenged in court. The FCRA applies to agencies that furnish consumer reports,
which are defined as information “bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.” 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2018). Courts have interpreted this to be a fairly generous definition. See
Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (determining that 
“handwriting is a ‘personal characteristic’ under the FCRA” so that a report on Johnson’s
handwriting could qualify as a “consumer report”); see also Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins.
Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (holding that communications 
about a person’s income, employment, or medical history qualify as consumer reports under
FCRA because they concern a consumer’s “personal characteristics”). This definition suggests
that any big data collected for the purpose of evaluating a consumer’s creditworthiness do, in fact,
constitute consumer reports.
 165. See  FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES 13 (2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DJF-S6NB] (noting that it is generally harder to provide an explanation of
challenged credit scores).
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1210 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1183
how their AI products come to conclusions.”166 Additionally, many
technology firms have recognized the lack of checks on AI and are 
attempting to provide a market solution by developing AI tools that 
can in turn be used to provide oversight of FinTech; hence, these tools 
being referred to as RegTech.167 In other words, the field is already 
improving and addressing this concern.168 
2. Inclusive Communities: Case Law on Disclosure. The issue of 
how much information ought to be disclosed would gain significant 
clarity if the courts weighed in. But waiting for a major court to rule on 
this issue, or even on an issue tangentially related to algorithm-based 
decision-making, is not feasible. Technology is growing faster than
jurisprudence can reach it.169 Fortunately, courts have provided some
guidance on a related issue.
The Supreme Court case that pertains most to FinTech lending is 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., decided in 2015.170 In Inclusive
Communities, the plaintiff brought a disparate-impact claim under the 
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).171 The Court held that such claims are
cognizable under the FHA172 and that to succeed on a disparate-impact 
claim, plaintiffs need not show that a policy was intentionally 
discriminatory.173 Rather, they must merely demonstrate that it had a
discriminatory impact on a protected class.174 However, the Court also 
described limitations “necessary to protect potential defendants
166. Louise Matsakis, What Does a Fair Algorithm Actually Look Like?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 
2018, 6:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/what-does-a-fair-algorithm-look-like 
[https://perma.cc/73EM-T3KD].
 167. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 165, at 19.
168. Allowing the field time to improve is also the rationale behind “regulatory sandboxes,”
which are laws that grant regulatory relief for innovators in various sectors. Aaron Stanley,
Arizona Becomes First U.S. State To Launch Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech, FORBES (Mar. 23, 
2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/astanley/2018/03/23/arizona-becomes-first-u-s-
state-to-launch-regulatory-sandbox-for-fintech [https://perma.cc/WXX9-N89Z].
 169. See Bruckner, supra note 14, at 57 (recognizing that even though some have suggested
that the judiciary is better suited to regulate algorithmic lending than the slow process of 
legislation, “‘[t]he comparative institutional disadvantage of courts’ in regulating consumer credit
markets has been repeatedly noted” (alteration in original) (quoting Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2008))). 
170. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015). 
171. Id. at 2513. 
172. Id. at 2525. 
173. Id. at 2513. 
174. Id.
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against abusive disparate-impact claims”175 and emphasized that the 
plaintiff has the burden to establish a “robust causality” between the
challenged practice and the alleged discriminatory effect.176 “[A] 
disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if
the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that 
disparity.”177 Only by proving a robust causation does the burden shift 
back to the defendant to prove “one or more substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests.”178 When that occurs, courts should grant 
businesses “leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by
their policies.”179 
One view of Inclusive Communities is that it is “a particularly 
sobering result” for FinTech lenders.180 By deeming the FHA claim 
valid, the Court took a massive step toward strengthening disparate-
impact claims under equal opportunity laws181 such as the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).182 An alternative interpretation of the
Court’s holding is that it supports disclosure of information so that 
claims brought under laws like the ECOA can be properly adjudicated. 
Courts could potentially apply this rule to cases where plaintiffs claim 
a failure to disclose. Since plaintiffs have the burden of establishing 
statistical evidence and a robust causal connection,183 it follows that 
borrowers who have legitimate concerns over a company’s compliance
with the ECOA or FCRA should be allowed to review the type of 
information that was used in a tangible and digestible form. Then, 
when businesses must explain their policies to prove a valid interest,
they will be expected to identify what factors they used in their analysis. 
The bottom line is that if a black box case appeared before the courts, 
it is likely that the courts would be sympathetic to the consumers’ 
argument that the black box nature of algorithm-based decision-
making impedes, rather than excuses, disclosure. 
175. Id. at 2524. 
176. Id. at 2523. 
177. Id.
 178. Id. at 2514–15 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2014)).
 179. Id. at 2522. 
180. KEVIN PETRASIC, BENJAMIN SAUL, JAMES GREIG, MATTHEW BORNFREUND &
KATHERINE LAMBERTH, WHITE & CASE, ALGORITHMS AND BIAS: WHAT LENDERS NEED TO 
KNOW 6 (2017), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/algorithms-and-bias-what-
lenders-need-know [https://perma.cc/9Z45-V8JR].
 181. See id. (explaining that “[a]n algorithm that inadvertently disadvantages a protected 
class” must now contend with laws that may give rise to “fair lending claims”). 
182. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018).
 183. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
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B. Proposed Solutions for Compliance with the Law 
In tandem, the FCRA and the Inclusive Communities decision 
seemingly give teeth to regulation of FinTech lending. For each of the
general issues contemplated by the CFPB and the Court—such as lack
of transparency, privacy invasion, and the biased nature of 
algorithms—more specific proposals have been pushed forward as 
means of achieving those ends. Proposals to regulate FinTech fall 
within several broad categories. These include proposals for 
algorithmic transparency,184 opt-out rights,185 and a “right to 
explanation.”186 
Algorithmic transparency, the most common of these proposals, 
requires companies “expose their algorithms” to the public.187 
Proponents of algorithmic transparency support disclosure of 
algorithmic code so that regulators and the public can identify how an 
algorithm is producing any allegedly harmful effects.188 Even though
this solution may help identify how algorithms may be secretly
discriminatory,189 algorithmic transparency does little to assuage the 
public’s privacy concerns. Most people are not computer scientists, so
handing them code is about as useful as not disclosing at all. 
Furthermore, this solution has been criticized for the side-effect of
revealing intellectual property and proprietary information.190 Even if
the United States’ intellectual property laws could offer some
protections, it becomes “significantly easier for bad actors . . . to steal
source code.”191 In the context of financial inclusion, this would
disincentivize companies from continuing to develop their algorithms 
at the risk of other companies copying it.
Another solution that has been offered is to allow users to limit 
the universe of data that companies are permitted to collect. Professors 
Nizan G. Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz were among the first to form a
184. JOSHUA NEW & DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION, HOW POLICYMAKERS 
CAN FOSTER ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2018), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2018-
algorithmic-accountability.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JTT-B9A9].
185. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 53, at 416–17. 
186. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 189 (2019).
 187. NEW & CASTRO, supra note 184, at 8.
 188. Id.
189. New and Castro consider algorithmic transparency a flawed proposal but see id. for a 
survey of sources arguing this point.
 190. Id. at 12. 
191. Id.











     
 
    
 
  
   
2020] WHAT’S IN THE “BLACK BOX”? 1213
framework for combatting privacy harms in social credit,192 which they 
termed the “right to be unnetworked.”193 Essentially, they advocate for
allowing consumers to opt-out of having their social information
collected unless it falls within a narrow set of exclusions.194 They argue 
that the FCRA does the same thing with its provision limiting the 
ability of creditors to use medical information to determine
creditworthiness.195 For instance, although identifying when a 
“consumer is terminally ill and factoring that information into [a 
lending calculation] makes perfect financial sense,” the FCRA still 
prohibits it.196 It is difficult to think of a reason this type of information 
receives special treatment other than the fact that medical history is 
uniquely sensitive information.
Packin and Lev-Aretz are clearly correct that, at minimum, some 
information must be excluded from the universe of calculations 
because existing regulations already contemplate such omissions.197 A 
general opt-out policy where consumers can exclude any information 
they see fit, however, faces several pitfalls. First, allowing customers to 
pick and choose what they want to opt-out of allows them to game the 
system. If consumers are aware that there is a wide universe of data— 
and that they can choose which of their best information is used to
portray an online image of creditworthiness—the algorithm model 
begins to lose its accuracy. As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons 
that FinTech lenders have been able to maintain low interest rates is 
an algorithm’s predictive ability. If that capacity is taken away, Packin 
and Lev-Aretz’s model of allowing users to choose certain data to be 
excluded begins to sacrifice access for a minimal improvement in
privacy. Moreover, it is unclear who would be responsible for 
implementing this solution, as both regulators and companies might be
averse to giving consumers this much discretion and will not act unless 
compelled. 
Finally, many key players have argued that consumers are entitled 
to know how the algorithm reached its result, dubbed as the “right to 
explanation.”198 But a full right to explanation, which would “explain” 
192. As mentioned in supra note 112, social credit is one form of alternative data collection.
It relies upon information on consumers’ social contacts and activities. 
193. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 53, at 417.
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 422–23. 
196. Id. at 423.
 197. See id. at 422–23 (discussing restriction on terminal illness data imposed by the FCRA). 
198. Kaminski, supra note 186. 
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information such as which factors the algorithm used and how it 
weighed those factors, faces many of the same issues plaguing
algorithmic transparency, like the danger of having proprietary 
information stolen and the deterrent effect on innovation.199 
Additionally, “[a]n algorithm’s accuracy typically increases with its 
complexity, but the more complex an algorithm is, the more difficult it 
is to explain.”200 To provide everyone a right to explanation, more
resources must be spent dumbing down the technology for 
interpretability rather than accuracy, which will in turn sacrifice gains 
in financial inclusion. 
C. The Optimal Approach
Of the preceding solutions, a full right to explanation most closely
aligns with the goal of transparency because it endeavors to provide 
consumers usable information; however, the solution falls short of the 
goal of prioritizing financial inclusion. Professor Sandra Wachter, Dr.
Brent Mittelstadt, and Dr. Chris Russell proposed one twist to the 
approach: provide a right to “counterfactual explanations,” which,
according to the authors, can be offered without opening the black
box.201 A counterfactual explanation consists of a decision followed by 
a counterfactual, or a “statement of how the world would have to be
different for a desirable outcome to occur.”202 For example: “You were
denied a loan because your annual income was [$]30,000. If your 
income had been [$]45,000, you would have been offered a loan.”203 
From a technical perspective, these explanations are far easier for 
developers to produce because algorithms are often simply a series of 
if-then counterfactuals.204 Once the machine weighs all variables, it can 
provide the “minimal amount of information capable of altering a 
decision.”205 
199. See NEW & CASTRO, supra note 184, at 9–13 (arguing that solutions for “explainability” 
and transparency share the same flaws).
 200. Id. at 13. 
201. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
841, 843–44 (2018).
 202. Id. at 844.
 203. Id.
204. The calculations and reasoning behind this premise are admittedly beyond this author’s
technical knowledge, but for a comprehensive explanation, see id. at 849–51, 854–55. 
205. Id. at 851.
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Counterfactual explanations fit seamlessly within FinTech lending 
because they allow FinTech lenders to comply with the requirements 
of the FCRA. If credit is denied, or unfavorable terms are provided,
the FCRA and Reg V require lenders to provide customers an
“adverse action” or “risk-based pricing notice,” respectively.206 
Counterfactual explanations would exceed those minimal 
requirements and perhaps set a new standard for what a transparent 
credit denial looks like.207 The sample form for credit denials under 
Reg V currently offers a limited number of nondescriptive categories 
for credit companies to state their reasoning.208 Counterfactual 
explanations, alternatively, would provide action items for borrowers 
to undertake.
For this reason, counterfactual explanations are also the optimal 
solution for effectuating financial inclusion because borrowers who
comply with the counterfactuals place themselves in an improved
position to receive loans. From the lender’s perspective, these
explanations are a mechanism for improving the risk profile of their
customer base so that defaults are further minimized. Counterfactual 
explanations also prevent “gaming of decision-making systems”209 
because borrowers must better themselves rather than artificially
choosing the factors they are evaluated under. “Well-informed
consumers who are empowered to report erroneous data or shift 
behaviors to improve their financial standing can enhance data quality
and reduce risk for providers while securing better outcomes for
themselves.”210 Since FinTech lenders can be confident that the 
customers are genuinely improving their spending behavior, the 
lenders can continue to extend loans to individuals who would
otherwise be considered subprime.
In terms of the risk of disparate impact, counterfactual 
explanations offer users the ability to identify whether any proxies for 
a protected class are affecting the decision. Each decision is 
206. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 159. 
207. See  WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 30, at 6 (“[I]nnovative companies are going
beyond legally required minimums of disclosure by transparently conveying the types of data
sources they use or explaining to consumers how their behavior can drive profile 
improvements . . . .”).
208. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 app. C, Form C-1, Part I—Principal Reason(s) for Credit Denial,
Termination, or Other Action Taken Concerning Credit (2015) (listing twenty-four options for
why credit action was taken, including an option labeled “other” for a company to describe its
reasoning).
 209. Wachter, supra note 201, at 883. 
210. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 30, at 6. 
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individualized, which means the disclosure provides the necessary 
information for a disparately impacted consumer to file a claim under 
the Inclusive Communities standard of a robust causal connection 
between a factor and a discriminatory effect.211 The following
illustrative counterfactual explanation provides a rejected borrower 
evidence of a robust causal connection between an illicit algorithmic 
methodology and the loan decision: “You were denied a loan because 
your close circle of contacts had low incomes. If your top contact had 
been [Caucasian Friend], you would have been offered a loan.” From
the FinTech lender’s side, counterfactual explanations can be tested to
ensure compliance with the law. For example, they can be used to 
regularly check whether changing a factor related to race or gender 
affects whether a borrower receives a loan.212 Overall, this tool would
need to be implemented alongside other data protection tools, but it 
offers numerous benefits for alternative lenders to increase access to
lending.
CONCLUSION
Now recall Brad Freeman, who has requested a digital consumer 
loan. This Note has established some potential parameters since 
initially considering Brad’s circumstances. First, when it asks for Brad’s
consent, IntelligentLoan must comply with rules mandating clear and
transparent disclosures about the fact that an algorithm will be used
and where the information is sourced from. Second, it is possible the 
risk factor of smoking is automatically off limits as a data point now. 
Although FinTech companies might find the factor relevant, regulators 
may consider smoking habits to fit within the same circle of policy 
exclusions as medical history. Third, an early counterfactual 
explanation trial of IntelligentLoan’s algorithm identifies the use of
neighborhood unemployment rates, a factor that is disqualified as a 
form of redlining. Finally, if Brad’s application is indeed denied, 
IntelligentLoan can mail Brad this notice, in compliance with the 
FCRA: 
211. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2523 (2015). 
212. Amit Katwala, How To Make Algorithms Fair When You Don’t Know What They’re
Doing, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ai-bias-black-box-sandra-
wachter [https://perma.cc/8NXQ-45HS].
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Dear Mr. Freeman,
Thank you for your interest. Unfortunately, our system has
calculated your credit profile and at this time, we are unable to offer 
you a loan. You were denied a loan because you use the internet late
in the evening, you demonstrate impulse-based shopping habits, and
the punctuation and grammar in your text messaging is either 
incorrect or deficient. If you make at minimum one or two changes by 
refraining from late-night internet use, searching options before 
purchasing goods online, or correctly applying punctuation and 
grammar in your text messages, you may be offered a loan. Please feel




Brad may still be slightly uncomfortable, but now he understands what 
he can do to improve his standing the next time he seeks a loan. The 
next day, Brad begins to do just that. FinTech is only going to play a
larger role in lending decisions made across the country, and the 
industry should fully embrace FinTech lending for the promise of 
greater financial inclusion of people like Brad. Ultimately, FinTech 
regulators endeavor to protect consumers who are at risk of 
exploitation. Brad Freeman represents the consumer who would
accept learning the minimum in the black box. If consumers are making 
such informed decisions to improve their self-value, regulators will
have accomplished their job, too.
